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111.

A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a Declaratory Judgment action filed by KGF Development, LLC.

("KGF"), against the City of Ketchum ("City").

260 First, LLC ("260 First"), intervened

in the action. In the Complaint, KGF claimed that Ketchum Municipal Ordinance
("KMO") 1034 was adopted in violation of the Local Land Use Planning Act ("LLUPA")
and the Historic Preservation Act, and therefore, Ordinance 1034 is void. Some discovery
occurred, and thereafter, KGF filed a Motion for Summary Judgment asserting that
Ordinance 1034 was void.
Honorable Robert J. Elgee, District Judge for the Fifth Judicial District, in and for
the County of Blaine, granted summary judgment against KGF. On January 28, 2009,
judgment was entered in accordance with the Court's Decision. From that Judgment, KGF
timely appealed.
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
On February 22, 2007, the Ketchum City Council adopted Ordinance 1005. The

Ordinance allowed for the transfer of development rights (sometimes referred to as
"TDR's").

KGF appealed the adoption of Ordinance 1005 and sought a declaratory

judgment that: (1) the ordinance was void for faulty notice; and (2) that the Ordinance
exceeded the City's authority. That case was Blaine County Case No. CV-07-250.' On
April 30, 2008, the District Court ruled in that case that Ordinance 1005 was void due to
the faulty notice.

'

Blaine County Case No. 07-250 was later consolidated with Blaine County Case No. 08-167, an
administrative appeal and declaratory judgment action contesting the issuance of a building permit under
Ordinance 1005.
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In the meantime, on February 19, 2008, the Ketchum City Council adopted
Ordinance 1034. Ordinance 1034 essentially restated O r d i c e 1005 but cured the
notice problem. KGF timely filed a declaratory judgment and an administrative appeal
from the City's adoption of Ordinance 1034. That case was filed as Blaine County Case
NO.CV 08-233.
After Case CV 08-233 was filed, the Idaho Supreme Court ruled in Euclid Avenue
Trust v. City of Boise, 146 Idaho 306, 193 P.3d 853 (Idaho), that it was not proper to
combine declaratory judgment actions with appeals from administrative actions.
Therefore, the parties stipulated to the dismissal of the Declaratory Judgment action in
Blaine County Case No. CV 08-233 and to its re-filing in this case, Blaine County Case
NO. CV 08-837.
On December 12, 2008, KGF filed for summary judgment in this case. Briefs
were submitted and oral argument was held on January 12, 2009. At the end of oral
argument, the District Court granted summary judgment against KGF. Judgment was
entered January 28, 2009. From the judgment, KGF filed a timely Notice of Appeal on
February 4,2009.

C.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

KGF owns property in City of Ketchum, State of Idaho, more particularly

described as follows: Units C1 through C12, 2, 4, 6 and 7, of the Copper Ridge
Condominiums, according to the official plat thereof, recorded as Instrument No. 530070,
records of Blaine County, Idaho ("Copper Ridge"). The property is located at 271 North
Washington Ave., Ketchum, Idaho. (R., p. 17, AfJidavit of Kevin G. Fortun, ¶2.)

2.

On December 15, 2005, the Copper Ridge plat was recorded. At the time

the Copper Ridge building was built, the maximum height for buildings in the City of
Ketchum was 38 feet. Copper Ridge was built to the maximum height, and is a threestory building. (R., p. 18, Afidavit of Kevin G. Fortun, ¶ 3.)
3.

The Copper Ridge building lies on the edge of a bench that overlooks the

property immediately to the west. (Id., q[4.) Under the existing Ketchum Ordinances at
the time Copper Ridge was built, the highest a building could have been built on the
Copper Ridge property without a waiver of the requirements of the Ketchum Municipal
Code ("KMC") was 38 feet, a three-story building. Id.; R., p. 46; Affidavit of Barry
Luboviski, ¶4.) Furthermore, at the time Copper Ridge was built, there were no buildings
in Ketchum that were higher than 38 feet, and the City had never permitted a building
over 38 feet. (Id., '35.)
4.

Therefore, due to Copper Ridge's location on the bench, its building was

constructed with extensive west facing windows in the penthouses that provided
unobstructed views of Mt. Baldy. (R., p. 18; Afjdavit of Kevin G. Fortun, 34.) Under the
existing zoning, and due to the bench, no building could have been built to the west that
would obstruct those views. (Id.) The views were expected to be and have been a major
selling point for the Copper Ridge penthouses, which were expected to sell in the
neighborhood of $3,000,000. (Id.)
4.

In 2006, the "Downtown Ketchum Master Plan" recommended that the

Historic Preservation Commission be engaged to advise the City of Ketchum on
preserving historic buildings through the use of transfer of development rights and that
the city planner take the lead on that effort. (R., p. 211, Exhibit I., Affidavit of Kathleen

E. Rivers, Exhibit 4, Robrahn Depo. p. 17,l. 21 - p. 20,l. 4; see also R., p. 211; Affidavit
of Kathleen E. Rivers, Exhibit 3; Cady Depo., Exhibit 3; Affidavit of Beth Robrahn,
Exhibit C, p. 57.)'
5.

Pursuant to that recommendation, Ketchum Planner, Beth Robrabn, began

preparing an Ordinance for the transfer of development rights. (R., p. 211, Exhibit 4,

Robrahn Depo., Tr. p. 20,l. 25 - p. 21,l. 8; see also Affidavit of Beth Robrahn, ¶ 8-12,
Exhibit 3). Ms. Robrahn stated that the purpose for drafting the Ordinance was for the
preservation of historic properties in the City of Ketchum. (R., p. 21 1, Affidavit of Beth

Robrahn, ¶ 8-12; Robrahn Depo.; Tr. p. 33, 1. 6-21; p. 29, 1. 25 - p. 30, 1. 9.) Ms.
Robrahn stated that the transfer of development rights Ordinance was not drafted to
protect open space, wildlife or critical areas. (R., p. 211, Affidavit of Beth Robrahn, ¶ 812, Tr. p. 33,l. 6 - p. 37,l. 15.)
6.

Ms. Robrahn attended Ketchum Historic Preservation Commission

meetings, reviewed the "Archeological and Historic Survey Report" (Survey) with the
Commission, and drafted Ordinance 1005. (R., p. 211, Robrahrz Depo., Tr. p. 24,l. 9 - p.
29,l. 18; p. 41,l. 13-15; p. 51,l. 6-9; see also, Affidavit of Beth Robrahn Tll-12.)
7.

As part of the Survey, the Commission also identified those properties in

the City of Ketchum that are either listed on or meet the criteria for listing on the
The Affidavit of Beth Robrahn, the Deposition of Beth Robrahn, and the two Administrative Records, are
Exhibits to the Record in this appeal and are itemized in the Exhibit List found at p. 21 1 of the Record.
Some of the deposition exhibits are duplicative. For example, the Affidavit of Beth Robrahn and the
Administrative Record in Blaine County Case No. 08-233 are both exhibits to the Deposition of Sandy
Cady and the Deposition of Beth Robrahn. To avoid duplicating copies of the Robrahn affidavit and the
two administrative records, the complete transcript and exhibits to the Deposition of Sandy Cady were
submitted on the Motion for Summary Judgment, while only the transcript of the Deposition of Beth
Robrahn was submitted with the Motion for Summary Judgment. Also, for clarity here, the citations
hereafter will be to the Robrahn Deposition Transcript (Robrahn Depo., TI.), to the particular
administrative Records (which are Exhibits 1 and 2 to the Cady Deposition), and to the Affidavit of Beth
Robrahn (which is Exhibit 3 to the Cady Deposition.)

National Register of Historic Places. (R., p. 211, AfJidavit of Beth Robrahn, Exhibit E
"Archeological and Historic Survey Report," Attachment 4; Robrahn Depo., Tr. p. 21,l.

8.

The Historic Preservation Commission recommended criteria for

designating a site as a Sendimg Site under the Ordinance and identified the properties it
wanted preserved as Sending Sites. (R., p. 211, AfJidavit of Beth Robrahn, q[12.) In
evaluating Sending Sites, the Commission looked at a site's historical, architectural,
educational, and cultural significance. (Id.)

9.

The Historic Preservation Commission's recommendation was to allow

the owner of property on which a historic building was located to sell their development
rights as an incentive for preserving the historic building. (R., p. 211, Robrahn Depo.,
Tr. p. 31.1.3-8.)
10.

Ultimately, the Ordinance drafted by Ms. Robrahn designated 40 Sending

Sites that could be preserved by allowing the property owner to sever the development
rights from that property and transfer them to any one of 68 Receiving Sites designated in
the Ordinance. (R., p. 211, Affidavit of Beth Robrahn, ¶14-18, Exhibit L; Robrahn
Depo., Tr. p. 41, 1. 13-15; p. 51, 1. 6-9.) The Sending Sites were limited to those sites
where a historic building or heritage site was located. (R., p. 211, Robrahn Depo., Tr. p.
30,l. 24 - p. 31,l. 2.)
11.

The Ordinance drafted by Ms. Robrahn was presented to the PIanning and

Zoning Commission as Ordinance 1005. Public hearings before the Commission were
held in Decem6er 2006. (R., p. 211, Affidavit of Beth Robrahn, m14-18; Robrahn Depo.,

Tr. p. 41,l. 13-15; p. 51, 1. 6-9.) The Planning and Zoning Commission recommended
the adoption of the draft Ordinance 1005. (R., p. 21 1, Affidavit of Beth Robrahn, ¶ 21.)
12.

Thereafter, in January and February 2007, the City Council held public

hearings on the draft Ordinance. (R., p. 211, Affidavit of Beth Robrahn, ¶ 22.) On
February 22, 2007, when the City Council ultimately adopted Ordinance 1005,
approximately half of the recommended Sending Sites were eliminated and the number of
Receiving Sites was increased. (R., p. 211, Affidavit of Beth Robrahn, m2.5.)
13.

As adopted, Ordinance 1005 was entitled "Transfer of Development

Rights." It designated 22 sites as Sending Sites and 102 Receiving Sites. (R., p. 211,
Affidavit of Beth Robrahn, 'j[ 26, and Exhibit L).
14.

The provisions of Ordinance 1005 most relevant to this case included the

following:
Only four (4) of the twenty-two (22) designated Sending Sites were either
listed or met the criteria for listing on the National Register of Historic
Places. (R., p. 211, Robrahn Depo., Tr. p. 39,l. 17-19; p. 43,l. 44 - p. 44,
1. 22). No other Sending Sites met those criteria. (Id.)
The method for calculating the square footage of development rights that
could be sold by the owner of a Sending Site to the owner of a Receiving
Site was based on the floor area ratio FAR^) of the Sending Site. (R., p.
21 1, Afldavit of Beth Robrahn, Exhibit L to affidavit.) Under the existing
zoning, development in the Community Core District (downtown
Ketchum) was limited to a FAR of 1.0. (KMC, Section 17.64.010.~.~)
To
encourage the preservation of the Sending Sites, rather than development
Ordinance 1005 is found in the Record at p, 21 1, Affidavit of Beth Robrahn, Exhibit L. However, for
simplification, citations hereafter will be to Ordinance 1005.
Floor Area Ratio is arrived at by multiplying the square footage of the Lot times the variable specified
under the zoning ordinance.
Ketchum Municipal Code Section 17.64.010 is attached to the Defendant City of Ketchum's Responses to
Plaintiff's Requests for Production and Requests for Admissions, Response to Request for Production No.
1 and is found in the Record at p. 21 I, Exhibit 2., Affidavit of Fritz Haemmerle, Exhibit 1 to Affidavit. For
simplification,citations hereafter will be to the particular Ketchum Municipal Code Section.

being limited to an FAR of 1.0, the owner of a Sending Site could sell
development rights of up to a 2.25 FAR to the owner of a Receiving Site.
(R., p. 211, AfSiavit of Beth Robrahn, Exhibit L.) On the purchase of
such development rights, the owner of a Receiving Site could build a fourstory building to a height of 50 feet and further development on the
Sending Site was limited. (Id.) Receiving Sites that did not purchase
development rights and all other non-designated properties continued to be
subject to the existing height limitation of 38 feet (three stories) and an
FAR of 1.0. (Id.; KMC, Section 17.64.010.H.)
The Sending and Receiving Sites designated under Ordinance 1005 were
interspersed throughout downtown Ketchum. (R., p. 211, Robrahn Depo.,
Tr. p. 37, 1. 12-15; AJjdavit of Beth Robrahn, Exhibit L.) Further, there
were no location limitations on the sale of development rights to
Receiving Sites. (Id.) Thus, an owner of a Sending Site could sell
development rights to the owner of a Receiving Site located next door,
which would result in a four story building located next to a one-story,
historic property. (R., p. 211, Robrahn Depo., Tr. p. 36, 1. 25 - p. 37, 1.
15; p. 40,l. 8 - 22); AJjdavit of Beth Robrahn, Exhibit L).
Vacant lots were not eligible to be Sending Sites. (R., p. 211, Robrahn
Depo., Tr. p. 35,l. 2-7).

15.

Ordinance 1005 was codified in the KMC as Section I, to Title 17,

Chapter 17.64.
16.

On March 21, 2007, after Ordinance 1005 was adopted, KGF filed a

Petition for Review and for Declaratory Judgment in Blaine County Case No. CV-07250. Among other things, KGF alleged defective notice in the adoption of Ordinance
1005. On April 30,2008, the District Court declared Ordinance 1005 to be null and void
due to defective notice.
17.

While that case was pending, the City redrafted Ordinance 1005 as

Ordinance 1034. On February 19, 2008, that Ordinance was adopted. (R., p. 211, Cady

Depo., Exhibit 2, Administrative Record, Blaine County Case No. 08-233, at Tab for City

Council Meeting, February 19, 2008).~ Ordinance 1034 restated Ordinance 1005 in its
entirety and made some minor modifications to the Ordinance unrelated to KGF's current
challenge. (Id.)
18.

Ordinance 1034 is identical to Ordinance 1005 in the following relevant

particulars:
Ordinance 1034 restated the exact same Sending Sites and Receiving Sites
as those designated in Ordinance 1005. ( I d . See also R., p. 211, Robrahn
Depo., Tr. p. 38,l. 15 - p. 39,l. 19; Affidavit of Beth Robrahn, Exhibit L).
Just as in Ordinance 1005, the same four (4) Sending Sites in Ordinance
1034 meet the criteria for inclusion on the NationaI Register of Historic
Places. (Ordinance 1034; R., p. 21 1, Robrahn Depo., Tr. p. 38,l. 15 - p.
39, 1. 19; p. 43, 1. 44 - p. 44, 1. 22). No other Sending Sites meet the
criteria. (Id.)
Ordinance
1034
restated
the
same
method
as
Ordinance 1005 for calculating the square footage of development rights
that can be sold by the owner of a Sending Site to the owner of a
Receiving Site. (Ordinance 1034, Section 2.I.5). Again, rather than its
development being limited to a floor area ratio (FAR) of 1.0, the owner of
a Sending Site can sell up to 2.25 times its development rights to the
owner of a Receiving Site (Id.) On the purchase of such development
rights, the owner of a Receiving Site can build a four-story building to a
height of 50 feet. (Id.; R., p. 211, Robrahn Depo., Tr. p. 47, 1. 16-20;
KMC, Section 17.64). Only very limited development can occur
thereafter on the Sending Site. (Ordinance 1034, Section 2.L6.a.iv.)
Receiving Sites that do not purchase development rights and all other nondesignated properties continue to be subject to the existing height
limitation under the zoning ordinance of 40 feet (three stories) and an FAR
of 1.0. (KMC, Section 17.64.010.H.)
Like Ordinance 1005, a designated Sending Site may transfer development
rights to any Receiving Site, and the Sending and Receiving Sites are
dispersed throughout the Community Core District. (R., p. 21 1, Exhibit 2,
Afidavit of Fritz X. Huemmerle, Exhibit 1 - Defendant City of Ketchum's
Responses to Plaintiff's Requests for Production and Requests for
Admissions, Response to Request for Admission No. 1; see also

'

Ordinance 1034 is found at R., p. 21 1, Cady Depo., Exhibit 2, Administrative Record, Blaine County
Case No. 08-233, at Tab for City Council Meeting, February 19,2008. However, for simplification,
citations hereafter will be to Ordinance 1034.
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Ordinance 1034, Figure 1). Thus, a four-story building could be located
right next to a one-story, historic property. (Id.)
Like Ordinance 1005, Ordinance 1034 does not allow the owner of a
vacant lot to transfer its development rights. (R., p. 211, Robrahn Depo.,
Tr. p. 35,l. 2-7; see also Ordinance 1034, Section 2., I., 5.j.)
19.

The City of Ketchum has not enacted an ordinance establishing a historic

district pursuant as set forth under LC. $ 67-4607. (R., p. 211, Exhibit 2, Affidavit of
Fritz X. Haemmerle, Exhibit 1 - Defendant City of Ketchum's Responses to Plaintiff's
Requests for Production and Requests for Admissions, Response to Request for
Admission No. 15).
20.

The City of Ketchum has not followed the procedures under I.C.

3 67-

4607 for designating historic properties.
21.

Prior to the time the District Court ruled that Ordinance 1005 was void, a

building permit was issued to 260 First LLC ("260 First"), for Lots 5, 6 and 7, Block 38,
Ketchum Townsite, based upon its plans to construct a four-story, 50-foot-high building
on the property. (R., p. 46, Affidavit of Barry Luboviski, 94.) The applicant proposed to
purchase development rights from a Sending Site under Ordinance 1005, and now that
the Ordinance has been declared void, under Ordinance 1034. (Id.) The application is
proceeding under Ordinance 1034. (Id.)
22.

The proposed four story, 50-foot-high building is on the property directly

west of the Copper Ridge property. (Id.) If not for Ordinance 1034,260 First could not
build a four-story, 50-foot building on its property. (KMC, Section 17.64.010.H.; R., p.
46, Afidavit of Barry Luboviski, q[4).
23.

As a result of the adoption of Ordinance 1005 and 1034, and 260 First's

application to develop a 50-foot building, the Copper Ridge building's views of Mt.

Baldy will be obstructed. (R., p. 18, Affidavit of Kevin G. Fortun, 96.) As a result of 260
First's proposal, KGF has already lost at least two sales of penthouse units, and has had
to agree to a $100,000 "hold back" on one sale pending the outcome of this legal action
as to the validity of Ordinance 1034. (R., p. 19, Id, 7[7.) If the Ordinance 1034 is upheld,
KGF will lose those funds. (Id.)

111.
A.

ISSUES PRESENTED

Whether Ordinance 1034 exceeds the City's authority to transfer development
rights.
1. Whether Ordinance 1034 exceeds the authority granted by Section 67-6515A
of the Local Land Use Planning Act ("LLUPA")?
2. Whether Ordinance 1034 exceeds the authority granted under the Historic
Preservation Act?
3. Whether the City of Ketchum has implied authority to adopt Ordinance 1034?

B.

Whether KGF is entitled to attorney's fees and costs?

IV.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard of review for summary judgment is as follows:
Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). All disputed
facts are to be construed liberally in favor of the non-moving party, and all
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record are to be drawn in
favor of the non-moving party. Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 126
Idaho 527,529,887 P.2d 1034,1036 (1994). "I.R.C.P. 56(e) provides that
the adverse party may not rest upon mere allegations in the pleadings, but
must set forth by affidavit specific facts showing there is a genuine issue
for trial." Carnell v. Barker Mgmt., Inc., 137 Idaho 322, 327,48 P.3d 651,
656 (2002) (citations omitted). "Affidavits supporting or opposing the
motion for summary judgment 'shall set forth such facts as would be
admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is
competent to testify to the matters stated therein.' " Id. 'The admissibility
of the evidence contained in affidavits and depositions in support of or in

opposition to a motion for summary judgment is a threshold question to be
answered before applying the liberal construction and reasonable
inferences rule to determine whether the evidence is sufficient to create a
genuine issue for trial." Id. "Summary judgment is appropriate where the
nonmoving party bearing the burden of proof fails to make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's
case." Id.

Sprinkler Irrigation Co. v. John Deere Ins. Co., 139 Idaho 691, 85 P.3d 667
(2004).

V.
A.

ORDINANCE 1034 EXCEEDS
DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS.

ARGUMENT
THE

CITY'S

AUTHORITY

TO

TRANSFER

There are two Idaho statutes that expressly authorize cities to adopt ordinances for
the transfer of development rights. Those are Idaho Code

5 67-6515A of the LLUPA,

and Idaho Code 5 67-4619 of the Historic Preservation Act.
Determining whether the City of Ketchum had statutory authority to enact
Ordinance 1034 involves rules of statutory construction and interpretation. Words of the
statute must be given their plain and ordinary meaning. Paolini v. Albertson's Inc., 143
Idaho 547, 549, 149 P.3d 822 (2006). A specific statute controls over a more general
statute when there is any conflict between the two or where the general statute is vague or
ambiguous. Ausman v. State, 124 Idaho 839, 842, 864 P.2d 1126, (1993); Hansen v.

State, 138 Idaho 865, 868, 71 P.3d 464 (Ct.App. 2003). Where the legislature has
expressly stated one thing it is deemed to have excluded another. Nebeker v. Piper

Aircraft Corp., 113 Idaho 609, 614, 747 P.2d 18, (1987). Statutes must not be read in a
manner that renders another statute a nullity. Hecla Mining Co. v. Idaho State Tan

Commission, 108 Idaho 147, 151, 697 P.2d 1161, 1165 (1985). Statutes must not be

interpreted in isolation but rather "in pari material' if they relate to the same subject.

Gooding County v. Wybenga, 137 Idaho, 201,204,46 P.3d 18,21 (2002).
In this case, applying rules of statutory construction, Ordinance 1034 must be
declared void because it does not satisfy the requirement of the LLUPA or Historic
Preservation Act.

1. Ordinance 1034 was not adopted under the LLUPA TDR provisions.
The LLUPA grants cities the authority to create development rights by ordinance
and authorize landowners to transfer such rights to fulfill the goals of the city to
"preserve open space, protect wildlife habitat and critical areas, and enhance and
maintain the rural character of lands with contiguity to agricultural lands suitable for
long-range farming and ranching operations." LC. 9 67-6515~(l)(a).'

In this case, the City admitted that Ordinance 1034 was not enacted under the
LLUPA TDR provisions. Rather, the Ordinance was enacted to preserve historic
buildings (Section 67-4619) under the Historic Preservation Act. Ms. Robrahn stated that
the purpose for drafting the Ordinance was for the preservation of historic properties in
the City of Ketchum. (R., p. 211, Robrahn Depo., Tr. p. 33,l. 6-21; p. 29,l. 25 - p. 30,l.
9.) Ms. Robrahn stated that the transfer of development rights Ordinance was not drafted
to protect open space, wildlife or critical areas. (R., p. 21 1, Robrahn Depo., Tr. p. 33,l. 6

- p. 37,l. 15).

' The legislative history for Section 67-65 15A makes it clear that "the objectives of a TDR program are to
preserve agricultural land and maintain Idaho's historic rural farming and ranching landscapes, habitat and
open space." (R., p. 21 1, AfSidavif of Kathleen Rivers, Exhibit 1 - Legislative History of Section 67-6515A;
see e.g. Addendum, at p. 16, Minutes, Local Government and Taxation Committee, March 15, 1999; see
also Addendum at p. 20, Letter from Idaho Association of Counties Legislative Chairman, dated March 15,
1999; see also Addendum, at p. 22, Letter from Idaho Association of Counties Executive Director, dated
March 15, 1999; see also Addendum, p. 17, Jaquet, Idaho Statesman, 3/7/93).

The concept of transferring development rights began with the "Downtown
Ketchum Master Plan." It recommended that the Historic Preservation Commission be
engaged to advise the City of Ketchum on preserving historic buildings through the use
of transfer of development rights and that the city planner take the lead on that effort.
(R., p. 211, Affidavit of Beth Robrahn, Exhibit C, p. 57; Robrahn Depo., Tr. p. 17,l. 21 p. 20,l. 4).
Pwsuant to that recommendation, Ketchum Planner, Beth Robrahn, began
preparing an Ordinance for the transfer of development rights from lots with historic
buildings to other lots. (R., p. 211, Apdavit of Beth Robrahn, 3 8-12; Robrahn Depo.,

Tr. p. 20, 1. 25 - p. 21, 1. 8). Ms. Robrahn attended Ketchum Historic Preservation
Commission meetings, reviewed the "Archeological and Historic Survey Report"
(Survey) with the Commission, and drafted Ordinance 1005. (R., p. 211, Robrahn Depo.,
Tr. p. 24, 1. 9 - p. 29, 1. 18; p. 41, 1. 13-15; p. 51, 1. 6-9; see also, Affidavit of Beth
Robrahn, 311-12).
The Historic Preservation Commission recommended criteria for designating a
site as a Sending Site under the Ordinance and identified the properties it wanted
preserved as Sending Sites. (R., p. 211, Afidavit of Beth Robrahn, q[12.). In evaluating
Sending Sites, the Commission looked at a site's historical, architectural, educational,
and cultural significance. (Id.)
The Historic Preservation Commission's recommendation was to allow the owner
of property on which a historic building was located to sell their development rights as an
incentive for preserving the historic building. (R., p. 211, Robrahn Depo., Tr. p. 31,1.3-

8). This process led to the enactment of Ordinance 1005. When that Ordinance was
declared void, Ketchum then adopted a restated version designated as Ordinance 1034.
The Record is replete with references to the fact that what are being preserved by
Ordinance 1034 are historic buildings in downtown Ketchum.

"The thrust of the

Commission's recommendation was to allow a historic building property owner to sell
their development rights as an incentive for preserving their historic building." (R., p.
211, Caddy Depo., Exhibit 1, Complete Certified Copy of Administrative Record for
Case No. CV 07-250, at Tab for Council Workshop, November 15,2006, Memorandum
from Beth Robrahn, Senior Planner to Mayor and City Council, dated November 15,
2006). "It is the Planning and Zoning Commission's recommendation to prioritize the
preservation of historic buildings."

(R., p. 211, Cady Depo., Exhibit I , at Tab for

Council Meeting, January 16,2007, Staff Report, I. Background, Paragraph 3).
In sum, the Ordinance was not enacted to and does not protect open space,
wildlife or critical areas. Therefore, if it is was the City's intent to adopt Ordinance 1034
under the LLUPA (Section 67-6515A), the adoption under the LLUPA exceeded the
city's statutory authority.

2. The Historic Preservation Act applies to the preservation of historic sites;
however, Ordinance 1034 does not comply with the Act.
The City's reliance on the Historic Preservation Act to justify Ordinance 1034
fails because the Ordinance does not comply with the requirements set forth in the Act.
Idaho Code 5 67-4619 of the Historic Preservation Act is the only section of the
Act that authorizes the transfer of development rights. That Section is specifically
entitled "Transfer of Development Rights." Section 67-4619 expressly allows for the

transfer of development rights only for "designated historic properties." Section 67-4619
reads:

Any county or city governing body may establish procedures
authorizing owners of desianated historic urouerties to transfer
development rights in such amounts and subject to such conditions as the
governing body shall determine. For the purposes of this section,
"development rights" are the rights granted under applicable local law
respecting the permissible bulk and size of improvements erected thereon.
(Emphasis added).
Idaho Code $ 67-4614, expressly entitled "Designation as Historic Property," is
the only statute in the Act that addresses the designation of "historic properties." That
Section authorizes a city to "adopt an ordinance designating one or more historic
properties." Section 67-4614 mandates that "[iln order for any historic property to be
designated in the ordinance, it must in addition meet tile criteria established for inclusion
of the property in the national register of historic places." Section 67-4614 reads as
follows:
The local governing body of any county or city may adopt an ordinance
designating one (1) or more historic properties on the following criteria:
historical, architectural, archeological and cultural significance; suitability
for preservation or restoration; educational value; cost of acquisition,
restoration, maintenance, operation or repair; possibilities for adaptive or
alternative use of the property; appraised value; and the administrative and
financial responsibility of any person or organization willing to underwrite
all or a portion of such costs. In order for any historic property to be

designated in the ordinance, it must in addition meet the criteria
established for inclusion of the aropertv in the national register of
historic places. For each designated historic property, the ordinance shall
require that the waiting period set forth in section 67-4615, Idaho Code, be
observed prior to its demolition, material alteration, remodeling or
removal. The ordinance shall also provide for a suitable sign or marker on
or near the property indicating that the property has been so designated;
provided however, that nothing in this chapter shall authorize or be
construed to allow the designation, regulation, conditioning or restriction
by ordinance or other means of any property or facility owned by the state
of Idaho.

(Emphasis added).

In this case, Ordinance 1034 does not satisfy the statutory requirements for
several reasons. First, the City of Ketchum has not adopted any independent Ordinance
designating a historic district or historic sites.
Second, even if the TDR Ordinance could be construed as an Ordinance
designating historic sites, the Ordinance is still defective because most of the designating
sending sites do not meet the requirements for being included on the National Register of
Historic Places. There is no dispute of fact that only four of the 22 designated Sending
Sites in Ordinance 1034 meet the criteria for inclusion of the property in the National
Register of Historic Places. (R., p. 211, Rohrahn Depo., Tr. p. 38,l. 15 - p. 39.1. 19; p.
43,l. 44 - p. 44,l. 22). No other Sending Sites meet the criteria. (Id.)
While the City could designate these four sites as historic properties and permit
the transfer of the development rights associated with these properties, Section 67-4619
does not authorize the transfer of development rights for any property than "designated
historic properties."8
Finally, there is no provision in Ordinance 1034 for signing or marking of
designated historic sites. Again, Section 67-4614 requires that the "ordinance &!! also
provide for a suitable sign or marker on or near the property indicating that the property
has been so designated."
Despite the express provisions for designation of TDR sites in the Historic
Preservation Act, the District Court ruled that Section 67-4612 could provide authority

The ability of the City to designate these four sites again depends on whether the City adopted a valid
Ordinance designating the historic sites. In this case, there is no such Ordinance.

for Ordinance 1034. The District Court's interpretation is wrong because it does not
comply with the basic rules of statutory construction. Section 67-4612 does not address
establishing TDR's, and it does no address the designation of "historic properties."
Again, Section 67-4619 is the only svecific and

statute in the Historic

Preservation Act that authorizes the transfer of development rights for "designated
historic properties." A specific statute controls over a more general statute when there is
any conflict between the two or where the general statute is vague or ambiguous.

Ausman v. State, 124 Idaho 839, 842,864 P.2d 1126, (1993); Hansen v. State, 138 Idaho
865, 868, 71 P.3d 464 (Ct.App. 2003). Likewise, the only swecific and exwress statute
addressing the "designation of historic properties" of the Historic Preservation Act is
Section 67-4614, entitled "Designation as Historic Property," and Section 67-4615,
entitled "Procedure for designation."
Section 67-4614 also expressly limits "designation" to those properties that meet
the criteria for listing on the National Register of Historic Places. Given the rules of
construction, the Court should not ignore the intentional use of the term "designate" in
Section 67-4619 authorizing the transfer of development rights for "designated historic
properties." Where the legislature has expressly stated one thing it is deemed to have
excluded another. Nebeker v. Pipcr Aircrafi Corp., 113 Idaho 609, 614, 747 P.2d 18,
(1987).
Furthermore, to interpret Section 67-4612 to authorize cities to permit the transfer
of development rights to any non-listed property would elevate a vague and general
statute over a more limited specific one, and otherwise ignore every single rule of
statutory construction. Since the legislature has adopted a statute, which specifically

addresses the transfer of development rights with respect to "designated historic
properties," it controls over Section 67-4612.
Also, interpreting Section 67-4612 as a separate grant of authority to a city to
enact a transfer of development rights ordinance with respect to any non-listed property
not only ignores the plain and specific language of Sections 67-4619 and 67-4614, it
essentially nullifies them. The broad interpretation suggested by the District Court would
essentially obliterate and render the entire Act meaningless as any city could, via Section
67-4612, do whatever it desired in regard to properties with any sort of historic value.
Statutes must not be read in a manner that renders another statute a nullity. Hecla Mining
Co, v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 108 Idaho 147, 151, 697 P.2d 1161, 1165 (1985).
Statutes must not be interpreted in isolation but rather "in pari materia" if they relate to
the same subject. Gooding County v. Wybenga, 137 Idaho, 201, 204, 46 P.3d 18, 21
(2002).
Finally, the legislative history for the Historic Preservation Act shows that Section
67-4612 was not intended to be a broad grant of authority to transfer development rights
in addition to the authority to do so under Section 67-4619. (R., p. 211, Affidavit of
Kathleen Rivers, Exhibit 2.) The title for the Act as presented in House Bill 96, sets forth
a separate clause referring to each individual statute in the Act in the order they appear in
the Act. (Id.) The clause referring to Section 67-4612 is called "Providing for special
restrictions that may be required by local ordinances." (Id.) The section referring to 674619 is called "Providing for transfer of development right." (Id.) The two sections are
separate and distinct.

Also, Section 67-4612 as first drafted included the provision "[sluch ordinances,
special conditions and restrictions, may include appropriate and reasonable control of the
use or appearance of adjacent or associated private property within the public view or
both." (Id.) This language was deleted in the amendments but indicates that the intent of
that statute had nothing to do with the transfer of development rights.
Contrary to the interpretation suggested earlier by the District Court, a more
reasonable way of interpreting Section 67-4612, and one which not only abides by all of
the rules of statutory construction but is supported by the legislative history, is to
interpret the statute as allowing cities to enact further restrictions on the use and
appearance of historic properties that are similar to but not in conflict with those
conditions and restrictions already enumerated in the Act. The Act restricts what can and
cannot be done to properties within a historic district and conditions such modifications
on "certificates of appropriateness." LC. $ 67-4608. It also sets forth conditions on
changes in use of such properties. LC. $67-4609.
The Act also restricts repairs and maintenance on properties in historic districts to
those, which do not involve a change in design, material, color or outer appearance, and
it, conditions repairs that do involve such changes on certification by the building
inspector that they are needed for safety reasons. LC. § 67-4611. The Act imposes
similar restrictions and conditions on designated historic properties. I.C. 8 67-4616. It
does not strain the rules of construction nor does it do violence to the other statutes to
interpret Section 67-4612 as allowing cities to impose other similar conditions and
restrictions on modifications to or demolition of historic properties.

Such an

interpretation would be consistent with the other provisions of the Act and not nullify
them altogether.
In short, a reasonable reading of the Act is that it establishes two ways to protect
historic properties: (1) by way of the creation of a historic district, Section 67-4607; or

(2) by way of individual designation, Section 67-4614.

Individually designated

properties, which by the statute are limited to those eligible for listing on the National
Register, are also eligible for the transfer of development rights. LC. $ 67-4619. Cities
may impose special conditions and restrictions on historic properties as long as they are
not in conflict with those outlined in the other provisions of the Act.
As for Ordinance 1034, it authorizes the transfer of development rights for 22
properties; however, only four of those properties meet the criteria for inclusion on the
National Register of Historic Places. Ordinance 1034 also does not contain any of the
mandatory conditions and restrictions required under Section 67-4616 that apply to
designated historic properties.
For all of the above reasons, Ordinance 1034 exceeds the authority granted under
the Historic Preservation Act for establishing TDR's. Therefore, Ordinance 1034 is void.

3. The City of Ketchum does not have implied authority under its general
police powers to adopt a TDR ordinance.
The City's main argument below (in which 260 First joined) was that under its
police powers, the City could have adopted the TDR Ordinance in spite of specific
transfer of development right provisions under the LLUPA (LC. $ 67-6515%)or in spite
of the Historic Preservation Act (LC.

5 67-4601 et. seq.); or alternatively, Ordinance

1034 is not precluded by existing statutes. (Tr., p. 32). In essence, the City's argument is

that it could enact any TDR Ordinance it so desired under its police powers. This
argument conflicts with Idaho precedent and rules of statutory construction.
The power of municipalities to zone is derived from the State's police power.
City of Lewiston v. Knieriem, 107 Idaho 80, 685 P.2d 821 (1984); Art XII, $3, Idaho

Const. As it relates to a municipality's authority to enact zoning laws, the Idaho Supreme
Court has held that the LLUPA has preempted the independent source of authority when
it comes to zoning. Gumprecht v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 104 Idaho 615, 617, 661 P.2d
1214,1216 (1983), overruled on other grounds, Boise City v. Keep the Commandments
Coalition, 143 Idaho 254, 141 P.3d 1123 (2006). 'The LLUPA provides both mandatory

(LC. $3 67-6503) and exclusive (Gumprecht v. City of Coeur d' Alene, 104 Idaho 615,661
P.2d 1214 (1983)) procedures for the implementation of planning and zoning." Sprenger,
Grubb & Assoc., Inc. v. Hailey, 133 Idaho 320, 321, 986 P.2d 343 (1999); see also,
Associated Tnxpayers of Idaho v. Cenarrusa, 111 Idaho 502,725 P.2d 526 (1986).

Also, the express provisions in the Historic Preservation Act negate a claim that
the City has implied and separate authority beyond the confines of the Act. Under the
"purpose" provision of the Historic Preservation Act, it is clear that the legislature
contemplated the Act to be the sole authority for cities to protect historic properties.
Section 67-4601 reads as follows:
Whereas the legislature of this state has determined that the historical,
archeological, architectural and cultural heritage of the state is among the
most important environmental assets of the state and furthermore that the
rapid social and economic development of contemporary society threatens
to destroy the remaining vestiges of this heritage, it is hereby declared to

be the gublic policy and in the public interest of this state to engage in
a comprehensive program of historic preservation, undertaken at all
levels of the government of this state and its political subdivisions, to
promote the use and conservation of such property for the education,
inspiration, pleasure and enrichment of the citizens of this state. It is

hereby declared to be the purpose of this act to authorize the focal
governing bodies of this state to engage in a comprehensive program
of historic preservation.
(En~phasisadded).
The fact that the express purpose of the Historic Preservation Act was to
"authorize the local governing bodies of the state to engage in a comprehensive program
of historic preservation" suggests that prior to the passage of the Act, the cities lacked
power to engage in historic preservation. To the extent that the Act authorizes cites to
preserve historic properties also suggests that any historic preservation must be done
within the provisions of the Act.
The fact that the City could not have enacted Ordinance 1034 under its own
independent authority is proven by the fact that the legislature took the affirmative action
of adopting TDR provisions authorizing TDR Ordinances under the LLUPA (Section 676515A) and the Historic Preservation Act (Section 67-4619). "Courts must construe a
statute under the assumption that the legislature knew of all legal precedent and other
statutes in existence at the time the statute was passed." City of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint

Ind. Hwy, 126 Idaho 145, 150,879 P.2d 1078, 1082 (1994). This Court must assume that
the Legislature knew of existing precedent at the time it passed or amended a statute.

State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654,659,978 P.2d 214,219 (1999). Therefore, this Court is
bound to construe the LLUPA and the Historic Preservation Act, under the assumption
that the Legislature believed its actions were necessary to empower cities to enact TDR
statutes.
Additionally, if in fact the City could have enacted any TDR Ordinance it desired,
one must query why our own Representative Jaquet, who presumably acts at the behest or

in the best interests of her constituents, went to the trouble to get Section 67-6515A
enacted. (R., p. 211, Afidavit of Kathleen E. Rivers, Exhibit 1).
The City cited four cases below to support its argument that the City has
independent police power authority to enact the TDR Ordinance: Gumprecht v. City of

Cocur d' Alene, supra; Envirosafe Sew. of Idaho v. Cty. of Owyhee, 112 Idaho 687,735
P.2d 998 (1987); Caesar v. State, 101 Idaho 158,610 P.2d 517 (1980); and Benewah Cty.

Cattlemen's v. Bd. of Cty. Com'rs., 105 Idaho 209,668 P.2d 85 (1983).
Yet, these cases offer no support. Neither Envirosafe, Caesar, nor Benewah Cty.
deal with the LLUPA or zoning. The cases were about whether particular non-zoning
ordinances adopted under claimed police powers were preempted by other state statutes.

In the alternative, the cases cited by the City support KGF.

For example,

Envirosafe involved an attempt to pass an ordinance regulating the disposal of hazardous
material. The Court ruled that the local ordinance was invalid because State regulation
implicitly preempted local regulation. Id. 112 Idaho at 690.
Likewise, Caesar did not involve zoning but rather involved a building code
provision requiring the installation of handrails in stairwells. In that case, the Court held
that an attempt by the City of Boise to regulate State building was preempted by State
law. Id. 101 Idaho at 161.

Benewah involved an ordinance preventing livestock from running at large. In
that case, the Court held that the local regulation which prevented livestock from running
at large was not preempted by State herd district law because "open range" land was
expressly not covered by State law. Id. 105 Idaho at 213.

Finally, if the City does have authority to adopt this Ordinance under its implied
police powers, then presumably that regulation must still comply with the statutory
requirements of uniformity in zoning required under the LLUPA. Again, "[tlhe LLUPA
provides both mandatory (LC. $ 67-6503) and exclusive (Gumprecht v. City of Coeur d'

Alene, 104 Idaho 615, 661 P.2d 1214 (1983)) procedures for the implementation of
planning and zoning." Sprenger, Grubb & Assoc., Inc. v. Hailey, 133 Idaho at 321.
The LLUPA requires that zoning within each district be uniform.
Within a zoning district, the governing board shall where appropriate,
establish standards to regulate and restrict the height, number of stories,
size, construction, reconstruction, alteration, repair or use of buildings and
structures; percentage of lot occupancy, size of courts, yards, and open
spaces; density of population; and the location and use of buildings and
structures. All standards shall be uniform for each class or kind of
buildings throughout each district, but the standards in one (1) district
may differ from those in another district.
LC. $67-65 11. (Emphasis added).
The Idaho Supreme Court had occasion to consider the uniformity requirement in

Moerder v. City of Moscow, 78 Idaho 246, 300 P.2d 808 (1956). In that case, the
ordinance at issue established a setback line that could vary from one block to the next on
the same street. In other words, the building line could be farther back on one side of the
street than on the other.

In reaching its decision that the ordinance violated the uniformity requirement
because it did "not establish a uniform regulation for each class of buildings within the
district," the Court stated:
The application and consequence of this ordinance is a gross
discrimination, in that it does not bear alike on all persons living within
the same territory. * * * it affects property differently on adjoining blocks,
or within the same block or on opposite sides of the street. As Judge Linn
of the Superior Court states: '* * * Consideration of the section will

disclose that the line may be further back from the street line on one side
of the street than on the other, and even on the same side of the street its
distance from the street line may vary in different squares, its location
depending wholly on how far back (if at all) a house or houses had already
been built, and if but one house had been built, its line would seem to
control all the other lot owners.
Id. at 250.

h discussing the challenged ordinance in particular, the Court stated:
Under the ordinance, setback lines could vary from one block to the next
on the same street. The building line could be farther back on one side of
the street than on the other, as in fact it was in the present case. The line
could even vary from year to year in the same block as additional houses
were constructed, if the ordinance were upheld.
Id.

Here, it cannot be said that Ordinance 1034 applies uniformly throughout the
Con~munityCore District. The only properties eligible for TDRs are the sites that are
identified as Receiving and Sending sites, which sites are scattered throughout the
Community Core District.

Furthermore, the properties that have been designated

Receiving Sites may reach heights of 50 feet while buildings on properties not so
designated are limited to heights of 40 feet. On Sending properties where development
rights have been sold, heights may be limited to one story. At the same time, there are
many lots in the district that are not designated Sending or Receiving sites, so that only
certain property owners have the opportunity to participate in the TDR program.
Also, since there are many more Receiving Sites than Sending Sites, not all of the
designated Receiving Sites can obtain excess development rights. As such, Ordinance
1034 essentially applies on a first-come, first-serve basis to whoever has the means or

wherewithal to develop first. Similarly, the control over what Receiving Site properties
will be eligible to build to four stories is left entirely to the intentions or whims of the

owners of Sending Sites who can freely decide who to sell to. Sending site owners can
refuse to sell development rights to particular owners of receiving sites for any reason.
Finally, there is no limitation in Ordinance 1034 as to how many sites may ultimately be
permitted as Sending or Receiving sites, further exacerbating the random application of
the Ordinance. These deficiencies result in a situation where four story-buildings and
three or fewer story buildings will be permitted in the downtown in a completely nonuniform manner.
There is no question that under Ordinance 1034, building heights will vary from
one block to the next on the same street. With only certain scattered properties eligible
for TDRs and with even those further limited by the particular desire of a Sending Site
owner to sell those development rights, or by the owner of a Receiving Site's desire or
financial ability to go to four stories, Ordinance 1034 does not bear alike on all persons
living within the same district and affects property differently on adjoining blocks, or
within the same block or on opposite sides of the street. As such, assuming arguendo that
the City could enact Ordinance 1034 outside of the parameters set in Sections 67-6515A
and 67-4619, Ordinance 1034 violates the uniformity requirement of Section 67-6511.

Ln sum, the Idaho Legislature has established an "explicit and express procedures
to be followed by the governing boards or commissions when considering, enacting and
amending zoning plans and ordinances authorized municipalities." In this instance, the
Legislature has granted municipalities authority and a process by which they can enact
TDR ordinances in limited circumstances, those circumstance being set forth in LC. 5 676515A and the Historic Preservation Act. Since Ordinance 1034 does not conform to
either provision, it is void.

B.

KGF IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS.

When a city ignores statutes and rules, and parties contest those actions, the
prevailing party is entitled to attorney's fees and costs. See e.g., Fisher v. City of
Ketchum, 141 Idaho 349, 356, 109 P.3d 1091, 1098 (2005). Where a city has no
authority to take a particular action, it acts without a reasonable basis in fact or law. Id.
citing Moosman v. Idaho Horse Racing Commission, 117 Idaho 949,954, 793 P.2d 181,
186 (1990). If the city's actions are based upon a reasonable, but erroneous interpretation
of an ambiguous statute, then attorney fees should not be awarded, but where a city acts
without authority, it is acting without a reasonable basis in fact or law. Ralph Naylor
Fanns, LLC v. Latah County, 144 Idaho 806,172 P.3d 1081 (2007).

In this case, for all the reasons cited above, in adopting Ordinance 1034,
especially after becoming aware of the problems with its authority to enact the
predecessor Ordinance 1005, the City acted unreasonably and without a reasonable basis
in fact and law. Furthermore, in enacting Ordinance 1034 to protect historic sites, the
City also acted without authority under I.C.

$5

67-6515A, 67-4619 and 67-4614.

Accordingly, KGF is entitled to attorney's fees and costs under I.C. 5 12-117 and I.A.R.
41.
VI,

CONCLUSION

There is no dispute about the facts. All that exists is a question of law for this
Court to determine. The question of law is whether the adoption by the City of
Ordinance 1034 is authorized by the LLUPA (67-6515A) or the Historic Preservation Act
(67-4601 et. skq). Since the preservation of historic sites is not within the authority
granted in the LLUPA, and since Ordinance 1034 does not comply with the express and

mandatory provisions of the Historic Preservation Act, KGF should be granted judgment
on its Complaint for Declaratory Judgment as a matter of law.
Also, the Court should award KGF its attorney fees and costs incurred in these
actions.
DATED thisg;ay

of' June. 2009.
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